Predicting CO2 emissions is of significant interest to policymakers and scholars alike. The following article contributes to earlier work by using the recently released "shared socioeconomic pathways" (SSPs) to empirically model CO2 emissions in the future. To this end, I employ in-sample and outof-sample techniques to assess the prediction accuracy of the underlying model, before forecasting countries' emission rates until 2100. This article makes three central contributions to the literature. First, as one of the first studies, I improve upon the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) by incorporating the SSPs, which did not exist when the RCPs have been released. Second, I calculate predictions and forecasts for a global sample in 1960-2100, which circumvents issues of limited time periods and sample selection bias in previous research. Third, I thoroughly assess the prediction accuracy of the model, which contributes to providing a guideline for prediction exercises in general using in-sample and out-of-sample approaches. This research presents findings that crucially inform scholars and policymakers, especially in light of the prominent 2
Introduction
The Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has institutionalized and firmly implemented the so-called "2
• C goal." Initially suggested in the mid-1990s, according to this target, the world community seeks to limit global average temperature rise to within 2 • C (e.g., Jordan et al., 2013; Field et al., 2014) . Any change in the climate associated with a temperature rise higher than 2 • C is seen as "dangerous," and mitigation and adaptation strategies as well as short-term and medium-term goals for policymakers are largely based on this threshold (Jordan et al., 2013, p.751) . The reduction in carbon dioxode (CO 2 ) emissions constitutes a central pillar for these goals and strategies to meet the 2 • C target: according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Field et al., 2014) , CO 2 emissions should not exceed 1,000 gigatons (Gt) by 2100 if the risk of not meeting the 2 • C goal should not be higher than 33 percent. In light of this, the IPCC (Field et al., 2014 ) also estimates that 748.2 Gt would be emitted by 2030, and significant reductions in countries' CO 2 rates would be necessary afterwards for not exceeding 1,000 Gt by 2100.
But how likely is it that this target will be achieved? Is it realistic to assume that countries would not pass 1,000 Gt of CO 2 emissions by 2100 and is it possible that emissions will decline around 2030? Jackson et al. (2015) , for example, highlight that emission rates have not increased in the past few years, while Le Quéré et al. (2016, p.607) state that the growth in emissions "was approximately zero" in 2015.
This may not necessarily suggest that emissions have peaked, and initial estimates of Le Quéré et al. (2016, p.607 ) also show that there was a slight growth in 2016. However, and the latter observation underlines this, for thoroughly addressing these and related issues, policymakers and scholars require accurate predictions of carbon emission development. Predictions not only allow to get a better informed idea about possible scenarios that may emerge in the future, but also help estimating expected costs of emission reductions, calculating potential benefits from preventing global warming, and identifying whether more effective and stringent climate policy measures are necessary (e.g., Ward, Greenhill and Bakke, 2010; Zhao and Du, 2015) . In the words of Riahi et al. (2017, p.154) , projections "help us to understand long-term consequences of near-term decisions, and enable researchers to explore different possible futures in the context of fundamental future uncertainties."
To this end, if predictions tell us that it becomes increasingly unlikely to meet the 2 • C goal if current emission patterns were to continue, the global community must strengthen and extend its policies.
Information on the likely future levels of emission behavior is necessary to arrive at reasonable conclusions.
It is therefore not surprising that a considerable body of literature focuses on predicting CO 2 emissions, both within and "outside" the IPCC (e.g., Van Vuuren et al., 2011; Field et al., 2014; Zhao and Du, 2015;  Pérez-Suárez and López-Menéndez, 2015; Le Quéré et al., 2016; Riahi et al., 2017) . The next section discusses these studies in detail, but it is important to note already here that their results are generally mixed: depending on the underlying assumptions about key predictors, emissions may increase, decrease, or not change much at all until 2100. For example, Zhao and Du (2015) mainly focus on Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in the post-1997 period and predict that CO 2 emissions will decrease by 25 percent by 2050. Pérez-Suárez and López-Menéndez (2015) analyze a global sample of states and forecast that some countries may increase their emissions until 2020, but others may not. Finally, the arguably most prominent study on emission predictions as it is also part of the last IPCC report, the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), identified four future scenarios for how emissions will develop until 2100. In three out of these four scenarios, CO 2 emissions are likely to rise at least until 2080; and even then, an eventual decline may not occur.
The following article seeks to contribute to this debate by using the recently released "shared socioeconomic pathways" (SSPs) (Kriegler et al., 2012; O'Neill et al., 2014; O'Neill et al., 2017; Hegre et al., 2016; Riahi et al., 2017) for the prediction and forecast of CO 2 emissions until 2100. The SSPs are based on historical data and future projections of inter alia three key variables: population, GDP per capita, and the proportion of young males with upper secondary schooling or higher. With these variables, the SSPs identify five different scenarios for the future and, most importantly, capture low and high barriers to adaptation and mitigation to climate change: 1 SSP1 (sustainability), SSP2 ("middle of the road"), SSP3 (fragmentation), SSP4 (inequality), and SSP5 (conventional development). I thus answer the call of the IPCC Scenario Process for AR5 that stated: "[n]ew sets of scenarios for climate change research are needed periodically to take into account scientific advances [...] ." 2 And I follow Riahi et al. (2017, p.165) in that I build on the "starting point for new climate change assessments through the lens of the SSPs and the new scenario framework." Needless to say, predictions and forecasts involve by definition some degree of uncertainty and depend on several assumptions, including an appropriate baseline model, and they can hardly account for random events. I believe, however, that this research makes several contributions to the literature and is likely to crucially inform policymakers (see also Hegre et al., 2013, pp.250-251) .
First, as one of the first studies (as an exception, see Riahi et al., 2017) , I improve upon the RCPs by incorporating the SSPs, which did not exist when the RCPs have been released. On one hand, the scenarios used for the RCPs are not decoupled from the physical processes associated with climate change, which might pose problems in terms of endogeneity. On the other hand, the underlying assumptions about socio-economic trajectories and priorities are not consistent between the RCPs (Van Vuuren et al., 2011) .
In fact, "scenario development after the RCP phase will focus on developing a new set of socio-economic scenarios" (Van Vuuren et al., 2011, p.16) . And, finally, the SSPs directly take into account policy decisions in that they are based on different mitigation and adaptation strategies (for an overview, see Riahi et al., 2017) . Second, I calculate predictions and forecasts for a global sample in 1960-2100. Earlier work predominantly focuses only on a subset of states, short time periods, or a combination of both.
My approach circumvents issues of limited time periods and sample selection bias in previous research.
Finally, I thoroughly assess the prediction accuracy of the underlying model, which is hardly done in earlier works. Pérez-Suárez and López-Menéndez (2015) or Pao and Tsai (2011) are a few exceptions that explicitly discuss the accuracy of their predictions, but this seems to be the exception rather than the norm. Eventually, I therefore may also contribute to providing a guideline for prediction exercises in general using in-sample and out-of-sample techniques and to the debates on the validity of policies based on empirical models on states' behavior (see, e.g., Choucri and Robinson, 1978; Goldstone et al., 2010; O'Brian, 2010; Carey, 2010, 2011; Ward, Greenhill and Bakke, 2010; Bueno de Mesquita, 2011; Gleditsch and Ward, 2013) . To the best of my knowledge, Riahi et al. (2017) is the only existing study that combines the SSPs with a CO 2 emission prediction exercise. I built upon that work by introducing a more parsimonious model, assessing the prediction accuracy, and thereby examining the consistency of results. I also consider a 4-fold cross-validation exercise for assessing the out-of-sample power of the predictions (see Ward, Greenhill and Bakke, 2010) , before forecasting emission patterns for the five SSPs until 2100.
This research presents findings that crucially inform scholars and policymakers, especially in light of the prominent 2 • C goal: none of the five SSP scenarios is likely to be linked to emission patterns that would suggest that achieving the 2 • C goal is realistic. Hence, without future adjustments, it is unlikely that the world community will meet the 2 • C goal; this is consistent with other prominent projection studies.
2 Determinants of CO 2 Emissions
Previous Literature
There is a large body of literature in the social and environmental sciences analyzing the determinants of countries' CO 2 emissions and, more generally, environmental performance at the outcome level (e.g., Congleton, 1992; Li and Reuveny, 2006; Ward, 2006 Ward, , 2008 Bättig and Bernauer, 2009; Bernauer and Koubi, 2009; Fiorino, 2011; López, Galinato and Islam, 2011; Spilker, 2012; Bernauer and Böhmelt, 2013a; Bernauer and Koubi, 2013; Liao and Cao, 2013; Spilker, 2013; López and Palacios, 2014; Böhmelt, Böker and Ward, 2015; Cao and Ward, 2015) . This literature usually focuses on a set of political, economic, and demographic factors at the domestic, international, and systemic levels for explaining states' emission patterns. For instance, democratic forms of government are mainly associated with a "greener" behavior, although the empirical evidence for a link between democracy and better environmental performance at the outcome level is mixed. States, which are also more embedded in the international system, may be more inclined to contribute to the global environmental good and, thus, have on average lower emission rates. Other prominent factors pertain to population, trade relationships, foreign direct investment, or civil society lobbying. Gassebner, Lamla and Sturm (2011) provide a recent meta analysis using Extreme Bounds Analysis and demonstrate that the strongest predictors of environmental quality and emissions pertain to the economic conditions of a country and, most prominently, GDP per capita. Although empirical evidence for the existence of an Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) (Selden and Song, 1994; Grossman and Krueger, 1995) , i.e., countries' CO 2 emissions first increase with development, but then decline once a tipping point has been reached, is mixed (e.g., Aklin, 2016; Dasgupta et al., 2002; Itkonen, 2012) , GDP per capita usually is robustly associated with emissions. The functional form may vary, though.
Ward, Greenhill and Bakke (2010) forcefully remind us that empirical results in the form of regression coefficients may not tell us much about how states' emission patterns will develop in the future. Policy prescriptions cannot be based on statistical summaries of probabilistic models. Moving from empirical analyses based on statistical significance to prediction offers a more solid scientific basis for assessing future levels of emissions, which is highly relevant both from a policy and scholastic perspective. And, in fact, a significant amount of studies have sought to actually predict CO 2 emissions for a global sample, in specific regions, or for individual countries for the future (e.g., Schmalensee, Stoker and Judson, 1998; Auffhammer and Carson, 2008; Van Vuuren and Riahi, 2008; Van Vuuren et al., 2011; Pao and Tsai, 2011; Auffhammer and Steinhauser, 2012; Durante et al., 2012; Kavoosi et al., 2012; Peters et al., 2013; Field et al., 2014; Zhao and Du, 2015; Pérez-Suárez and López-Menéndez, 2015; Le Quéré et al., 2016; Riahi et al., 2017) . On one hand, there are those prediction and forecasting studies that are part of the IPCC Assessment Reports, i.e., the RCPs (since 2009) or their predecessor, the Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES; in 2000) (see Nakicenovic et al., 2000; Peters et al., 2013) . On the other hand, the are prediction and forecasting studies "outside" the IPCC. In that context, one of the most prominent predictions of CO 2 emissions is given by Schmalensee, Stoker and Judson (1998) Zhao and Du (2015) explicitly build upon the reduced-form approach in Schmalensee, Stoker and Judson (1998) , particularly due to its attractive built-in assumption of "change-as-usual" instead of "business-as-usual." To this end, it is assumed that "future climate policy would continue to be strength-ened at roughly the historical pace" (Zhao and Du, 2015, p.40) . The authors also intend to improve upon earlier work by using more updated data and the post-1997 period for making their predictions.
Their analysis, based on a sample of OECD countries, emphasizes that a peak in emission output may introduce the SSPs to the scientific community, but derive quantitative projections of CO 2 emissions until 2100 using integrated assessment models. Riahi et al. (2017, p.162) find that emissions are likely to increase in three out of the five SSPs (SSP2, SSP3, and SSP5) until 2100, albeit at different growth rates.
For two of the SSPs (SSP1 and SSP4), Riahi et al. (2017, p.162 ) report a decrease in total emissions, although the peak of these curves may be well after 2030.
In light of this overview, it is apparent that results are generally mixed: depending on the underlying assumptions about key predictors, emissions may increase or decrease after a specific tipping point has been reached until 2100. Some of this ambiguity may be explained by certain model specifications, though. For example, Zhao and Du (2015) mainly focus on OECD countries only in the post-1997 period and predict that CO 2 emissions will decrease by 25 percent by 2050. Moreover, their scenario data are based on the SRES (Nakicenovic et al., 2000) , which have been replaced by the RCPs and the SSPs by now O'Neill et al., 2017) . Pérez-Suárez and López-Menéndez (2015) analyze a global sample of states and forecast that some countries may increase their emissions until 2020 only, but others may not. Finally, the RCPs that were also part of the last IPCC report, identified four future scenarios for how emissions will develop until 2100. In three out of these four scenarios, CO 2 emissions are likely to rise at least until 2080; and even then, an eventual decline may not occur. As indicated above, I seek to make three central contributions to this end, which improve upon earlier work: based on Riahi et al.
(2017), I explicitly consider the SSPs; I present a forecast for a global sample until 2100; and I assess the prediction accuracy of the underlying model.
Data and Empirical Strategy
My predictions and forecasts are based on an OLS regression model that analyzes data on CO 2 emissions.
All (previous, current, and potential) states, for which data are available and are identified in the list of independent states (Gleditsch and Ward, 1999) , are units of analysis and they are observed once every year. Thus, the structure of my data is monadic and is defined by the "state-year." I use data from the US Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (Oak Ridge National Laboratory) and Appalachian
State University that provide information on carbon dioxide emissions (in thousand metric tons of C) at this monadic, state level as the dependent variable. 3 CO 2 emissions are defined as "those stemming from the burning of fossil fuels and the manufacture of cement. They include carbon dioxide produced during consumption of solid, liquid, and gas fuels and gas flaring." Data are currently available for the period from 1960 to 2014, and this is also the period I focus on when assessing the in-sample and out-of-sample prediction power of my model. The final dependent variable is log-transformed.
Coming to the predictors of this outcome variable, I employ the SSPs (Kriegler et al., 2012; O'Neill et al., 2014; O'Neill et al., 2017; Riahi et al., 2017) . In the words of Hegre et al. (2016, p. 2):
"The SSPs were developed to evaluate the uncertainty in how impacts of climate change and the ability to mitigate adverse societal effects may evolve as a function of socioeconomic drivers. The scenarios are designed to span a range of alternative futures and are shaped by different assumptions about society, including economic development, education improvements, and population growth. Unlike earlier scenarios developed by the climate change research community -such as the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios -the SSPs are explicitly decoupled from the physical processes associated with climate change. Instead, each pathway is defined in terms of challenges to climate change mitigation and adaptation. High challenges to mitigation are here understood as involving high dependence on fossil fuel-based energy and low levels of international cooperation on global environmental issues. High adaptation challenges are characterized by low development growth rates, low investments in human capital, and increasing economic inequality (O'Neill et al., 2017) ." There are five different SSPs, which seek to capture different combinations of adaptation and mitigation scenarios (Table 1 ; for a more detailed overview, see Riahi et al. (2017) Related to this is, thirdly, population, which is also taken from the IIASA and the Wittgenstein Center for Demography and Global Human Capital model (Samir and Lutz, 2014; Lutz et al., 2007) .
GDP per capita, or economic development, is one of the strongest predictors of carbon dioxide emissions (e.g., Pérez-Suárez and López-Menéndez, 2015; Zhao and Du, 2015) . Moreover, all else being equal, a larger population is normally associated with a higher emission rate. And educational attainment not only captures human development, but should also proxy state capacity and technological sophistication (Jänicke, 1985 (Jänicke, , 2008 Bernauer and Böhmelt, 2013b) . Due to the skewed distribution of population and GDP per capita, I employ log-transformed versions in my model. Finally, in light of the discussion on the EKC (Selden and Song, 1994; Grossman and Krueger, 1995) , I also consider the squared term of GDP per capita (ln).
Next to the substantive predictors pertaining to the SSPs, I also include country fixed effects and a year trend. The country fixed effects capture any time-invariant state-specific factors that may affect countries' emission patterns. These unit dummies are included for both the prediction accuracy tests as well as the forecast until 2100. The year trend is considered for both empirical approaches as well, while it addresses time dependencies more generally and technological advancement as a systemic influence:
7 higher values pertain to more technological sophistication (Jänicke, 1985 (Jänicke, , 2008 Bernauer and Böhmelt, 2013b) . Year fixed effects address the same issue as the time trend, but the results presented below are qualitatively the same when replacing the year trend by year dummies. 8 Note that the year trend also (partly) corrects for the potential non-stationarity of the variables involved: variables with a trend are likely to correlate as well, although this might be spurious. A year variable then addresses "co-trending" of items as it controls for the time trend common to all variables. In fact, as I demonstrate below, the time trend is statistically significant and, thus, seems to capture an effect that is not explained by the other variables in the model.
9
The following equation summarizes the model I will be using for the predictions and forecasts, with Y it (ln) pertaining to the logged CO 2 emissions (dependent variable), X it stands for the battery of covariates (i.e., logged income, its square term, logged population, and education), Z it refers to the country fixed effects, and Y ear t (ln) pertains to the year-trend variable (also logged).
With this data setup, to arrive at the forecast of emission patterns in 2015-2100, I complete the following steps. First, for determining the prediction accuracy of this model, I estimate it on a time-series cross-sectional sample for the period from 1960 to 1995, which I then assess with in-sample techniques. Out-ofSample Forecasts, 2015-2100 punish [this] quite heavily." Instead, they suggest using a time trend variable, which is my approach.
9 I return to this issue in the Supplementary Materials.
I begin by assessing how effective the model actually is in predicting emission patterns in-sample. Put differently, how accurate are the "conditional statements about a phenomenon for which the researcher actually has data, i.e., the outcome variable has been observed?" (Bechtel and Leuffen, 2010, p.311 To assess the accuracy of this prediction more thoroughly, I follow Pao and Tsai (2011, p.2454) and use three goodness-of-fit measures: the mean squared prediction error (MSPE), the mean absolute error (MAE), and the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) (see Chatfield, 1996 Chatfield, , 2000 . The MSPE pertains to the expected value of the squared difference between the actually observed values of CO 2 emissions and the predicted values. The MAE is the expected value of the absolute difference between the actually observed values of CO 2 emissions and the predicted values. Finally, the MAPE is defined by the average of the unsigned percentage error, i.e., it is the expected value of the absolute difference between the actually observed values of CO 2 emissions and the predicted values divided by the actually observed values. All these statistics are relatively easy to compute and interpret: the closer any of these statistics is to 0, the more accurate is the model in making predictions. However, the MSPE and the MAE are scale-dependent; only the MAPE is not. Pao and Tsai (2011) and Lewis (1982) suggest to this end focusing mainly on the MAPE, where less than 10 percent of error constitute a highly accurate forecast, 10-20 percent stand for a good one, and 20-50 percent may still be seen as a reasonable forecast.
More than 50 percent of error according to the MAPE are seen as inaccurate.
The MSPE value of the prediction exercise underlying Figure 2 is 0.129, the MAE is 0.240, and the MAPE is 0.041. Correspondingly, these formal test statistics also suggest that the in-sample power of my model is given in 1960-1995. For example, the absolute percent error according to the MAPE is only 4.1 percent, i.e., the prediction is "off" by only about 4 percent. It remains to be seen, though, how accurately this model predicts emissions when moving to the "harder" test of an out-of-sample prediction and the model is confronted with "new" data.
Hypothesis testing that ignores out-of-sample heuristics faces the inherent risk of fitting to a specific sample's idiosyncrasies, rather than identifying stable structural relationships between a dependent variable of interest and its determinants (see Ward, Greenhill and Bakke, 2010) . In fact, if a model explains the relationship between, in my case, emission behavior and the SSP variables fairly well in-sample, we merely assume that it also performs well when presented with new data (i.e., out-of-sample). Yet, if the model only gives a description of this relationship in the original data set without capturing underlying causal relations, then making correct and useful predictions with new data is likely to be undermined (see Beck, King and Zeng, 2000; Ward, Greenhill and Bakke, 2010) .
For the out-of-sample analyses, I begin with a 4-fold cross-validation quasi-experimental exercise, which I repeated 10 times for the baseline model (Model 1 above, 1960 (Model 1 above, -1995 . For this cross-validation, I randomly divide the sample underlying Model 1 into four segments of about the same size. I then use three random segments to estimate the parameters, while the fourth segment, also called the "test set" (Ward, Greenhill and Bakke, 2010, p.370) , is retained for assessing the predictive power of the baseline model on the pooled subsets. Therefore, I use three segments of the data to build the model and create predictions, while a last (randomly chosen) part of the data is not considered for estimating the model in the first place, but I merely use it for comparing predicted with observed values, i.e., assessing the predictive power of the model. As in the in-sample analysis above, I rely on the MSPE, the MAE, and the MAPE. I repeat this procedure 10 times and also calculated the average values of the prediction accuracy measures across these 10 exercises. Eventually, the purpose of this approach is to assess the model's predictive power when trying to correctly predict emissions that are not "within the very same set of data that was used to generate the models in the first place" (Ward, Greenhill and Bakke, 2010, p.8) . See Ward, Greenhill and Bakke (2010, p.370) , for example, for a more detailed discussion of this approach. Table 3 summarizes the findings. Not surprisingly, the prediction power of the model decreases when confronted with new data in this 4-fold cross-validation, although it remains at reasonably high levels. The MSPE increases from 0.129 in the in-sample prediction to 0.140 in the validation exercise. Similarly, the MAE is raised from 0.240 to 0.250, while the MAPE changes from 0.041 to 0.043. Table 2 above. There is evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between GDP per capita and CO 2 emissions, larger populations are associated with more emissions, and Education is now statistically significant at the 1 percent level. However, and after having positively assessed the prediction power of this model in-sample and out-of-sample, the key question is how this model predicts emissions for the time period from 2015 to 2100. Table 1 According to all scenarios, emissions are likely to rise well after 2030. Third, it seems, however, that a peak might be reached between 2060 (e.g., SSP1) and 2080 (e.g., SSP4), although this does not imply that emissions will fall (shortly) afterwards. In fact, only SSP4 and SSP5 are associated with a decreasing slope of the median emission level when approaching 2100. The other scenarios seem to remain relatively stable once the maximum has been reached. Fifth, the average yearly median level of emissions across all five scenarios is 22,841.40 Kt (0.023 Gt) per country in 2100. This corresponds to 4.44 Gt (based on N =193 for 2014, taking current United Nations membership as a reference point), which pertains roughly to a scenario between RCP4.5 and RCP3-PD (Peters et al., 2013; Jordan et al., 2013, p.753 ).
The RCP4.5 scenario is generally linked to a global average temperature increase between 2 and 3
• C, while RCP3-PD is associated with an average temperature rise between 1.3 and 1.9
• C.
My findings, as they are based on the SSPs that do incorporate mitigation and adaptation strategies, point to lower total emissions than "most non-climate policy scenarios," which "predict emissions of the order of 15 to 20 Gt by the end of the century" (Van Vuuren et al., 2011, p.20) . In sum, although my forecast suggests a "more optimistic" future than any projection in Riahi et al. (2017, p.162) , where total global emissions in 2100 range between 25 Gt and 120 Gt of CO 2 emissions, and than RCP8.5 (4-6.1
• C) or RCP6 (2.6-3.7
• C) (Peters et al., 2013; Jordan et al., 2013, p.753) , it highlights that circumstances are likely to be worse than in the case of RCP3-PD (1.3-1. emissions afterwards (or at any point in the future), and thus achieving the 2 • C goal (e.g., Jordan et al., 2013; Field et al., 2014) as such. Ultimately, the results, considering them in their entirety, suggest that meeting the 2 • C goal, i.e., the world community seeking to limit global average temperature rise to within 2 • C (e.g., Field et al., 2014) , may not be achieved. This assessment is in line with Jordan et al. (2013, p.752) , among others, who also consider the possibility that the goal might be "pushed out of reach altogether."
Conclusion
Assessing the predictive power of empirical models and forecasting state behavior in the future have important implications for scholars and can also offer significant benefits for policymakers. With this research, I sought to build upon and extend earlier work on predicting CO 2 emissions by employing the shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs) (Kriegler et al., 2012; O'Neill et al., 2014; O'Neill et al., 2017; Hegre et al., 2016; Riahi et al., 2017) as predictors. This article has sought to make three central contributions to the literature. First, as one of the first studies (for an exception, see Riahi et al., 2017) , I have improved upon the RCPs by incorporating the SSPs. Second, I forecasted for a global sample in 1960-2100, which circumvents issues of limited time periods and sample selection bias in previous research. Third, I assessed the prediction accuracy of the model.
The results of my research suggest that none of the SSP scenarios is likely to be associated with an emission output that may be compatible with reaching the 2 • C goal (e.g., Jordan et al., 2013; Field et al., 2014) in light of anticipated adaptation and mitigation policies. While these are directly incorporated into the SSPs, recall as well that the reduced-form model I have employed also assumes "change-asusual" (Zhao and Du, 2015; Schmalensee, Stoker and Judson, 1998) . However, my research strongly emphasizes that more efforts are necessary than currently in place or even anticipated by my model.
In a recent article, Jordan et al. (2013) discuss various policy alternatives if the 2 • C goal may not be met for preventing further risks and damage. My work highlights that studying these alternatives again, linking them to current predictions and climate models, and seeking to implement them in the most cost-efficient and effective way seems indeed paramount. Note, however, that after assessing potential costs and comparing them with likely benefits, Jordan et al. (2013) conclude that recommitting to the 2
• C goal may actually the best alternative.
It is worth noting that the my forecasts are based on some fairly restrictive assumptions (see also Hegre et al., 2013) : that the forecasts for my predictors turn out to be correct, that the past relationship between the predictors and emissions will continue to hold in the future, and that my model captures all major factors. All of these premises can be questioned. I conclude, nevertheless, that my results are substantively important and point to crucial implications for scholars and policymakers alike.
